Table of Contents
This fifteenth installment continues exploring the critical period “Between the Nakbas” (1948–1967). Having examined the internal situation in Israel and Palestine, this article shifts focus to the surrounding Arab states. It exposes the hollowness of the slogans of Arab Nationalism, the wave of coups and assassinations that swept the region, and how Arab regimes—despite their rhetoric—effectively suppressed Palestinian aspirations and secured the borders of the Zionist state, setting the stage for the devastating defeat of 1967.
In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All Praise is due to ALLAH and Peace and Blessings be upon the Messenger of ALLAH, His family, His companions, and those who align with Him.
Welcome, beloved brothers, to a new article in the “The Story of Palestine“. In this series, we attempt to summarize the essence of Palestine’s history, from the inception of the idea of a Jewish return to the land, up until the moment the Flood erupted in October 2023. The aim is to understand the roots of this story: And what is the future of this story as mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah, and as indicated by current events?
For those who wish to verify details and expand their knowledge, these episodes are extracted from my book “Summary of the Story of Palestine“1; the link is available in the sources, allowing anyone to trace the information to its sources accurately and in detail.
In the previous article, the narrative paused at the conditions of Palestine and Israel in the period between the two Nakbas (between 1948 and 1967). To complete this picture, the focus now turns to the conditions of the Arab countries surrounding Palestine during this period.
The Era of Coups and the Rhetoric of Arab Nationalism
The Nakba triggered a violent wave of coups, assassinations, and revolutions in the Arab region, specifically in the confrontation states. Interpretations of the Nakba and its causes varied, and consequently, solutions and proposals anticipating the future or aiming to achieve the liberation of Palestine also varied. This internal wave, stemming from overwhelming Arab-Islamic indignation at the loss of Palestine, intersected with another Western wave: the wave of Americans and Soviets inheriting British and French influence in the region.
Therefore, the Arab region was crowded with actors, adventurers, secret organizations, and differing policies; new bodies began to emerge, new parties formed, and new movements and groups appeared. These actors found external supporters, and these external supporters found an environment, climate, and many elements in which they could invest and build.
For all these reasons, the years following the Nakba were among the most bustling, confused, and active years in the Arab world, specifically in the region of Egypt, the Levant, and Iraq (the region surrounding Palestine). The final result for the region was in favor of the superior victors, the winners of World War II (the Americans and Soviets).
The issue of Palestine can be taken as clear evidence that the entirety of what occurred within the political class and political strata—coups, revolutions, and changes witnessed by the Arab region—did not ultimately bear fruit in favor of the Arab peoples. In reality, Arab countries and societies did not emerge from foreign influence. Although monarchies turned into republics, kings were replaced, presidents of republics changed, and assassinations and coups occurred, the stance on Palestine remained constant.
None of these Arab regimes harmed Israel, and none of them possessed genuine efforts, plans, or intentions to liberate Palestine or support the Palestinians. This is a general rule that must be noted, indicating that this popular Arab-Islamic indignation was contained, absorbed, and assimilated into the other wave: the Western wave of inheriting old colonialism.
Egypt: From Monarchy to Military Rule
If a look is taken at these countries, starting with Egypt: Before the 1948 war ended, the Egyptian authority—at that time under the monarchy—pounced on the Muslim Brotherhood (which was the striking force among volunteers for Jihad in Palestine). A decision was issued to dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood, confiscate its funds, and arrest its leaders and members, including even the volunteers fighting alongside the Egyptian army. The Egyptian authority raised the slogan that “the Brotherhood is more dangerous than the Zionists”, which perhaps reminds you of something happening now as well. Afterward, the Egyptian authority assassinated the leader of the Brotherhood and founder of the group, Imam Martyr Hassan al-Banna, may ALLAH have mercy on him.
The group then entered a phase of wilderness after this severe blow. However, there was a group within the Egyptian army led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. This group managed to build on previous efforts (of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian army), as well as on previous efforts of communists and other movements that Egypt teemed with at the time. They executed a military coup by which they seized power. This was an American-orchestrated operation to inherit British colonialism in Egypt. With this coup, Egypt moved from British influence to American influence.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the foundations for executing this coup through its members in the army—the two most critical missions in this coup were carried out by two officer members of the Brotherhood; the two main palaces of King Farouk (the palace in Cairo and Alexandria) were besieged by Brotherhood members—the group received a crushing blow at the hands of Abdel Nasser after he secured his rule over Egypt. He also managed to infiltrate the group and scatter its leadership.
Abdel Nasser monopolized the rule of Egypt and inaugurated an era of intense injustice, intense darkness, and intense corruption. The historian Dr. Ahmed Shalaby (the Egyptian historian) called this era the “Era of Injustices and Defeats“. In his encyclopedia Islamic History (Part Nine), Dr. Ahmed Shalaby speaks of this era under the title: “The Era of Injustices and Defeats”. This era was harsher on Egypt than the era of British occupation; indeed, the era of British occupation cannot be compared to it.
Abdel Nasser never won a single battle. He squandered the unity with Sudan; Sudan separated from him after Egypt and Sudan were one country. Unity with Syria came to him; the Syrians came and practically forced unity upon him, yet he could not keep it for more than three years. He was defeated in the Yemen War, and he was defeated in two wars against Israel (the 1956 war and the 1967 war). When Abdel Nasser died, Egypt had lost Sudan, the Gaza Strip, and Sinai, not to mention what befell the country in all other fields (politics, economy, society, culture, morals, etc.). Truly, this era was a severe catastrophe for Egyptians.
It is true he did much screaming about liberating Palestine and the alleged Zionist state, yet Abdel Nasser never thought of attacking Israel. This is according to the testimony of Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (his close friend and confidant). In the book The Suez Story, from page 22, Heikal speaks about how Abdel Nasser never thought of attacking Israel; in fact, Abdel Nasser accepted the settlement of 12,000 families in Sinai. His thinking about peace was reported; in Golda Meir’s memoirs, she said Abdel Nasser was afraid of being assassinated as King AbduLLAH of Jordan was, and were it not for that, he would have proceeded with the issue of peace.
He said: “If Dayan walked or if Ben-Gurion came to me, he would return to Israel and be received as a hero, whereas if I visited Israel and returned, they would assassinate me”.
Abdel Nasser even reduced the army budget in the first years of his rule, which Heikal also mentioned in The Suez Story. Even the same military commanders who caused the defeat of 1956 remained in their places and positions until they were defeated again, a more severe defeat, in 1967. Truly, the army and even the rest of the state’s educational and economic institutions were in a terrible state of corruption and degeneration. This was the state of Egypt (the largest Arab country at that time) between the two Nakbas.
Syria: The Carousel of Coups
As for Syria: After 1948, it can be said that Syria inaugurated the era of military coups in the Arab world; it was the first Arab country to undergo military coups. These multiple coups indicated—or were means, arms, tools—for the dominant colonial powers. For example, Syria witnessed three military coups in just one year:
- The coup of Husni al-Za’im (March 1949), which was an American coup (Americans inheriting old colonialism).
- The coup of Sami al-Hinnawi, attempting to restore old influence (Al-Hinnawi’s coup was in August).
- Then the coup of Adib al-Shishakli (in December). All this in the year 1949.
Adib al-Shishakli later tried to rule from behind a civilian curtain. When he failed in this, he executed a second coup (this being the fourth military coup) in November 1951, monopolizing military rule until another coup occurred against him in 1954. This 1954 coup was led by Faisal al-Atassi, who overthrew Shishakli’s rule and handed power to civilians. Syrians lived a period that could be called the “Spring of Democracy”, a period of four years from 1954 to 1958.
In 1958, Shukri al-Quwatli (the Syrian President) went to Egypt with the project of unity between Egypt and Syria. Although Abdel Nasser was not welcoming (he said: “Let us start with cultural unity, economic unity, etc…”), al-Quwatli and the Syrian elite insisted on this unity and unification. Abdel Nasser found no escape but to respond, so the union between Egypt and Syria occurred, and the new state was named the “United Arab Republic”.
However, this unity soon collapsed after only three years because the Syrians could not endure the Egyptian junta that ruled Syria and tried to lead it in the violent criminal manner happening in Egypt. A military coup against the Egyptian authority occurred in 1961, and Abdel Nasser surrendered to that coup. With his corrupt policies first, and his surrender and withdrawal second, it can be said that Abdel Nasser wasted a priceless golden opportunity for union between the two most important Arab countries at that time.
In 1963, another military coup occurred; this was the beginning of the dangerous, pivotal military coups. In 1963, the coup was executed by the “Military Committee” of the Ba’ath Party, and with it, Syria entered the era of the Ba’ath Party (or the dark, black Iron Ba’ath era).
This matter worsened after an internal military coup (among Ba’athists) in 1966, which ousted the old guard of Ba’athists and caused the split of the Ba’ath Party between Iraq and Syria. Then another internal coup occurred in 1970, led by Hafez al-Assad, which ousted the last manifestations of civilian rule and the last remnants of political life. An era of tyranny began in Syria that was the worst to pass over the Levant in all of history. Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Hafez al-Assad in Syria: their rule was the darkest to pass over the two countries up to that time.
Reviewing this passing overview of the Syrian situation, it becomes very clear that Syria had neither the readiness nor the opportunity to do anything for Palestine; quite the opposite. Husni al-Za’im (leader of the first coup)—he was American-inclined—tried to start peace with Israel. He actually offered full normalization with Israel and exchange of ambassadors, and even offered to accept 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria.
However, at that time, Ben-Gurion was the one who refused. Why did he refuse? Because Ben-Gurion did not want to start peace with Syria, nor did he want to reach a partition of the Sea of Galilee; he wanted to seize the entire Sea of Galilee. Consequently, Ben-Gurion rejected the “golden” peace offer presented by Husni al-Za’im because this offer was narrower than the broad ambitions Ben-Gurion held.
Jordan: The Loyal Guardian
As for Jordan: Unlike the two other countries, Jordan enjoyed being the most stable and established regime. It is the only country where the ruling system did not change, nor even the ruling family. Rule continued with king AbduLLAH and continued after him in his lineage. This does not mean he enjoyed popular satisfaction or had intrinsic strength; he had neither popular support nor intrinsic strength, but the occupation powers held him (from falling). The Jordanian regime remained the most compliant, most serving, and most loyal regime to foreign powers. It proved its efficiency through this complete responsiveness, compliance, and continuous harmony with foreign interests, specifically in the Palestinian cause.
After the 1948 war, king AbduLLAH began ruling the West Bank and annexed it to the Jordanian Kingdom. When king AbduLLAH ruled the West Bank, he became exposed to everyone: to what extent this man aligned with the English and Zionists, and how he was one of the fundamental pillars in the betrayal of Palestine and the handover of the remaining land.
Highlighting this betrayal further were the enmities king AbduLLAH had with the regimes of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and of course, his enmity with Amin al-Husseini, the most prominent Palestinian leader. All this contributed to shedding light on him; the Egyptian press and Egyptian media… The rest of these regimes that opposed him contributed through their media to exposing his betrayals and holding him responsible for the betrayal and corruption that occurred (naturally, they were all partners in betrayal, but they were louder than him and more capable of exposing him than he was of exposing them).
His matter ended with his assassination by a young man from Jerusalem in Al-Aqsa Mosque on July 20, 1951. This was the first punishment to befall a ruler betraying Palestine. His grandson king Hussein (who became king later), Hussein bin Talal bin AbduLLAH, mentioned in his memoirs My Profession as a King—he was a witness to this assassination because he was with his grandfather at the time—king Hussein mentioned that king AbduLLAH expected to be assassinated.
King Hussein even mentioned that others in the entourage expected king AbduLLAH to be assassinated, including the American ambassador. One of the things that opened the eyes of king Hussein (the grandson) was how quickly the King’s entourage dispersed and fled from him at the moment of assassination; this was one of the events that influenced him.
What was the effect of this assassination on the story of Palestine? This assassination cast its great effects on the souls of the rest of the Arab rulers. Abdel Nasser feared he would be assassinated if he proceeded with peace with Israel. Even the Jordanian regime itself was forced later to dissimulate (take another path), hiding its betrayals and communications with the Zionists, English, and Americans.
The Jordanian regime itself began to adopt a public Arabist approach, not as it was in the days of king AbduLLAH. It can be said that this operation had the merit of delaying the train of public normalization for 30 years, and delaying the train of Jordanian normalization for 40 years (the assassination happened in 1951; the first attempt after that was Sadat’s attempt in 1979, followed by Jordan’s attempt in Wadi Araba). This operation halted the train of normalization between Arab rulers and Israel.
After king AbduLLAH, his son Talal took over. His son Talal was 42 years old at the time, but he was soon removed from power after less than a year. It was said he suffered from mental illness and was deposited in a sanatorium outside the country, where he remained for more than 20 years until he died. This is one of the mysteries of contemporary Arab history; the matter remains undisclosed, and to this day, the truth of this subject and this illness is unknown.
It is frequently repeated in many sources that Talal bin AbduLLAH was not as compliant to the English as his father. Therefore, it is said that this is the reason “Glubb Pasha” conspired against him (the English commander who led the Jordanian army). Glubb Pasha conspired against him with Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda (a man also steeped in treason); they conspired against him, presenting a narrative that he was mentally ill and unfit to rule. Consequently, he was removed so that his son, king Hussein bin Talal bin AbduLLAH (king AbduLLAH’s grandson), could take over.
Hussein at that time was still seventeen years old, but he remained in power for half a century (from 1952 to 1999; i.e., 47 years). King Hussein followed his grandfather’s path in identifying and aligning with the Israelis. With changing global circumstances, he transferred his loyalty to the Americans when British power set. Famous sources revealed that he was registered among the agents of the CIA, having a code name, a code number, and a known periodic salary; this is a famous scandal whose details can be searched.
Truly, the Jordanian regime is considered one of the most dangerous Arab regimes, and one of the most cunning, astute, and malicious. The circumstances in which the Jordanian regime emerged made it prioritize politics, cunning, and astuteness; not to be a brutal regime (not like the Egyptian regime, not like the Iraqi regime, not like the Ba’ath regime in Syria, not even like the Gulf regimes; Gulf regimes originally have more violence, true the origin is politics but they have more violence). However, the nature of the Jordanian regime’s emergence, because the ruling family has no roots in this region, forced it to take the path of maneuvering in all files.
It is a child of the British occupation (and the British occupation is astute, always prioritizing the use of tricks and deception over violence). It is a weak ruling system with no natural roots in this land, but it ruled and prevailed in this land by the power of British occupation. Afterward, it rules a poor country with small resources, a country that is manufactured; consequently, it was not possible for it to continue ruling or for state resources to exist unless it clung to what resembles a British “umbilical cord”, and of course, the American and Israeli cord as well.
Although his grandfather (Sharif Hussein) and even his direct grandfather (king AbduLLAH) wrapped themselves in the idea of Arab Nationalism, however, Arab Nationalism later shifted to have its centers in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. These were countries with large populations and rich resources, and their leaders had ambitions matching their countries (undoubtedly they were stronger personalities, stronger presidents, and had greater capabilities). These three regimes (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) were also dominated by communist regimes—or leaned in their various chapters toward communism—while Jordan alone was the regime expressing or connected to, supported by the Americans and the Western camp; therefore, it also lived in a state of hostile surroundings.
Another factor: The Jordanian regime rules a people the majority of whom are Palestinians (families and tribes connected across the Jordan River, across the two banks). When Palestine was occupied, many migrated to Jordan. Consequently, when the Jordanian regime controlled the West Bank and held onto it (and those displaced from Palestine to the East Bank), it was a regime that—given the internal forces, the surrounding forces, and the international situation—had no way to be brutal. So, it walked this path: the path of acting, deception, and maneuvering. It is Arabist in tongue and slogans, but its practical policies are Zionist-American.
Therefore, one of the effects of this is that it opened the doors of the country, and even opened many positions, to fleeing Islamists escaping the hell of regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (The Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, Iraq… Islamists suffered from communist regimes and found refuge in Jordan). When it opened its doors, it did not do so out of love for Islamists, but to immunize its people and immunize the people within from turning against it in response to Abdel Nasser or in response to the rest of these regimes.
Consequently, it began to trade on the Palestinian cause, allowing some movements and some calculated spaces, not out of belief in the idea of Jihad, but practicing this containment and venting to absorb this energy calling for Jihad against Zionists and the liberation of Palestine. Consequently, as days passed, the regime grew stronger and began closing these spaces that were available to Islamists or Palestinians.
A fruit of this and one of its effects is that the Jordanian security apparatus is stronger and more dangerous than the Jordanian army. It can be said that they are the most dangerous security apparatuses at all; they were not apparatuses dominated by violence (like Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Algeria), but were apparatuses more professional, softer, more efficient, and connected to the Americans, English, and Zionists. Consequently, Jordan in this way managed to be the best means of securing Israel; it shares the longest border with it (650 km) and contains a Palestinian majority.
It gives space to Islamists and Palestinian resistance movements, but they cannot go out of its obedience nor execute what they want of jihadist or liberation ambitions. It is truly a distinguished model in burying all liberation movements and burying Islamic movements with “soft containment” constraints, not by brutality and abuse. This does not mean it was not fierce if the opportunity came; it was fierce, it bombed, killed, and tortured. But the meaning is that this astuteness, malice, and cunning were greater and more prevalent in the Jordanian regime’s policy than brutality and abuse.
This Jordanian model is what made the rest of the regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (and also some Palestinians with them) use it as an excuse and pretext that it hinders projects to liberate Palestine; because Jordan is the largest front and the widest front for engagement with Israel. Consequently, this situation made anyone who wanted to cast an excuse, or cast the burden, or cast the blame say “Jordan”. And Jordan says: “Everyone should struggle from their own country! Do you want to entangle me in a war?”. Both parties are truthful when narrating the crimes of the other party.
When you read the memoirs of politicians—starting from kings, presidents, and ministers in these countries—and see how they cast failure, occupation, and the Nakba on each other; both parties are truthful if they narrate the crimes of the other party. The truth is that everyone is a criminal, everyone; there is not a noble, honest, or innocent one among them.
The Jordanian regime, since it emerged until this moment we speak, has been of one nature. Benjamin Netanyahu (the Israeli Prime Minister) summarized this nature; he released his memoirs in October 2022, in which he says this important phrase:
“I told king Hussein that I consider the survival of the Hashemite Kingdom a vital Israeli interest. If necessary, we will intervene militarily to prevent its fall”
This phrase is sufficient to demonstrate the importance of the Jordanian regime to the Israelis.
The Road to the Second Nakba
If we want to summarize the most prominent conclusions drawn from the conditions of the Arab countries in the period between the two Nakbas regarding Palestine, we say:
- These countries never truly sought unity. Although all raised slogans were slogans of unity, every regime was keen on stabilizing itself and cultivating, deepening, and entrenching its local national identity, even if the tongue and slogans were “Unity is the path to liberation and Arabism…”, as the Almighty said: “…saying with their mouths what was not in their hearts…“2 (Suurat ‘Ali ‘Imraan, 3:167).
- These countries did not allow even the Palestinians displaced to them to work seriously toward liberating Palestine, nor did they allow Palestinian leaders or even Palestinian youth to work and move; on the contrary, these Palestinian figures and movements met persecution from these regimes equal to what the locals met, and perhaps more severe.
- The major countries among these regimes (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) tried, each one of them, to make Palestine a file belonging to it (a card in its hand to bargain and negotiate with); thereby tearing or scattering the Palestinians and their directions. Each regime began trying to attract a faction, group, and segment of Palestinians. Therefore, practically, the Palestinians were divided and torn, and jealousy and grudges grew among them (and aspirants exist in every society). Competition began over who would lead them and how to displace others; this is an effect of their attempts to penetrate and use the Palestinian card to bargain for themselves.
- All these countries (the Arab countries) did not—not a single one of them—think of warring against Israel or liberating Palestine. Each regime mobilized its security force and mobilized its military force to stabilize its rule and oppress the people in its country.
The era between the two Nakbas ended with the second Nakba, a catastrophe no less dangerous than the first and no less horrible than the first: the Nakba of 1967. Whoever saw and looked at these conditions would naturally expect that we were heading toward another catastrophe.
What is the story of this other catastrophe? This is what we will see, ALLAH willing, in the next article.
We ask ALLAH, the Blessed and Exalted, to teach us what benefits us, to benefit us with what HE has taught us, and to increase us in knowledge. Peace, Mercy, and Blessings of ALLAH be upon you.
Sources:
Mohamed Elhamy. قصة فلسطين | 15. انقلابات وثورات وحروب.. أوضاع البلاد العربية بعد النكبة. Telegram Video.
- The Summary of the Palestine Story ↩︎
- Saheeh International translation ↩︎
