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This sixteenth installment explores the catastrophic events of the 1967 War, widely known as the Six-Day War. Having previously examined the internal situation in Israel, Palestine, and the surrounding Arab states between 1948 and 1967, this article shifts focus to the sudden and devastating conflict that reshaped the Middle East. It exposes the lack of preparation by Arab regimes, the shocking speed of the Israeli advance, and how the war resulted in the occupation of the remaining Palestinian territories, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, setting the stage for decades of ongoing struggle.
In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All Praise is due to ALLAH and Peace and Blessings be upon the Messenger of ALLAH, His family, His companions, and those who align with Him.
Welcome, beloved brothers, to a new article in the “The Story of Palestine“. In this series, we attempt to summarize the essence of Palestine’s history, from the inception of the idea of a Jewish return to the land, up until the moment the Flood erupted in October 2023. The aim is to understand the roots of this story: Why does it remain burning and inflamed even now? How did Herzl succeed where his ancestors failed for 3,000 years? And what is the future of this story as mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah, and as indicated by current events?
For those who wish to verify details and expand their knowledge, these episodes are extracted from my book “Summary of the Story of Palestine“1; the link is available in the sources, allowing anyone to trace the information to its sources accurately and in detail.
In the previous two articles, the conditions of Israel, Palestine, and the Arab states during the period between the two Nakbas (1948 and 1967) were discussed. Now, the narrative enters the story of the second catastrophe: the Nakba of 1967.
The Astonishing Scope of the Defeat
In reality, many secrets of the 1967 War remain concealed despite almost sixty years having passed since it occurred. This is because the Arab regimes that existed at that time are still in power today, and they are regimes that do not publish their archives. Therefore, this leaves the historian reliant on the memoirs of eyewitnesses that were permitted to be published, and on foreign research related to the subject.
What is astonishing about this war (the 1967 War) is that Abdel Nasser rushed into it as if he were fully prepared, only to receive a sweeping, crushing blow as if he had never thought about war or even considered it. The catastrophe of ’67 was not limited to Egypt alone, because Israel invaded the territories of several Arab states in a single day (which was the fifth of June, 1967):
- From Egypt: It invaded and occupied the Gaza Strip (because it was under Egyptian sovereignty), and then the Sinai Peninsula. The Sinai Peninsula’s area is larger than the area of Israel itself; Sinai is twice the size of all of Palestine. Imagine a state invading an area equivalent to three times its own size in one day.
- From Syria: It occupied the Golan Heights. The military position of the Golan Heights is extremely critical and fortified because it is an elevated plateau.
- From Jordan: It occupied the West Bank (which was under Jordanian sovereignty).
We can say that Palestine—according to contemporary divisions—was entirely occupied, or rather, what remained of Palestine (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank). These were the two remaining pieces that Egyptian and Jordanian forces squandered, and then abandoned permanently afterward. Thus, this abandonment was one of the greatest betrayals in our contemporary history.
Egypt and Jordan controlled the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the slogans of Arabism; because they were against the establishment of an independent Palestinian government, they controlled them using the slogans of Arab Nationalism. Yet, when Israel occupied them (or when they were handed over to Israel), they abandoned these two regions and subsequently embraced the slogans of “patriotism”, claiming, “This is the Palestinians’ issue”0
The Decisive First Hours and the Build-up
The 1967 War was called the “Six-Day War“, but in truth, its first six hours were the decisive ones. Therefore, this war is sometimes described—as our professor Jalal Kishk, may ALLAH have mercy on him, says—as “the greatest victory achieved in any clash of its kind since the collapse of the Byzantine Empire before the Arabs“. Meaning, since the Islamic conquests, it had never happened that a country could sweep through lands larger than itself in such a manner and with with such speed.
The spark of the war began when Abdel Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation. At that time, Egyptians learned for the first time that Israel had actually been navigating in Egyptian waters since 1956. This was a gain Israel had extracted in the 1956 war, which Muslims knew nothing about. Now, when Abdel Nasser closed the strait to Israeli navigation, Egyptians realized that Israelis had been sailing through this strait all along.
This closure served as a dangerous military escalation. He followed this by requesting the international police forces—which separated the Egyptian and Israeli borders—to leave and depart. Among the gains Israel achieved were navigation rights and the presence of police forces ensuring that Israel could not be surprised by an Arab attack. Now, Abdel Nasser sent word to these police forces to leave, which explicitly meant he intended to launch a war. Despite this, he subsequently did absolutely nothing afterward to prepare for this war.
This led many historians to believe that Abdel Nasser merely wanted to threaten and escalate to provoke international intervention, or to force major powers to concede to some of his demands (whether financial or political gains). When he was surprised that his escalation brought him no one and achieved no gains, but rather he was surprised that the international police forces actually left (he said: leave, so they left!), he did not know what to do next.
Consequently, the Egyptian forces remained paralyzed, lacking any kind of preparation. On the contrary, reserve soldiers were summoned and thrown into the crucible of the battle “not knowing where the borders were nor where the Jews were“. Even Heikal (who is considered Abdel Nasser’s philosopher and spokesperson) wrote in Al-Ahram newspaper that “Egypt decided to take the first strike”.
The Crushing Reality on the Ground
If only, when they decided to absorb the first strike, they could have managed it or avoided it; but in reality, the first strike was utterly devastating, as if it were a total surprise. Thus, Abdel Nasser sought war as if he were preparing for it, then dealt with it as if it had never crossed his mind.
The war began with the comprehensive destruction of the Egyptian Air Force. The Egyptian Air Force was grounded (lined up on the airfields) and completely exposed without any protection; it was as if it had been prepared for slaughter and destruction, which is exactly what happened. This is one of the strangest historical military events (for an air force to remain in this state).
Afterward, military orders were issued to Egyptian soldiers for an urgent withdrawal from Sinai without any plan. The withdrawing forces, lacking defensive cover or a strategy, were like prey or sacrificial lambs; they were exposed to Israeli aviation, and exposed even to the ground forces that invaded Sinai. Therefore, the Israelis began bombing these forces and vehicles as if they were hunting (as if practicing a hunting hobby). As a result, they killed more than ten thousand and easily captured more than five thousand. Some of these captives they killed and buried in mass graves, while others they kept and later released in a state of extreme humiliation and degradation.
Adding to the crisis and the shock was that the Egyptian press and radio (Egypt at that time was the primary and largest media window in the Arab world) were broadcasting news of Egyptian victories over enemy forces, the downing of enemy planes, and the burning of enemy tanks. Thus, the Egyptians and the Arabs genuinely imagined that the Egyptian army was on the verge of entering Tel Aviv.
When did the awakening happen? When did the shock occur?
When Gamal Abdel Nasser came out on the ninth of June (after four days) in 1967 to announce the defeat, or rather to present his resignation to the people. He presented it in a manner—as the Arab proverb goes—”acting coy while desiring it” (he even said: I have made a decision I want you to help me with). He announced that he bore his share of the responsibility (not that he bore all the responsibility). Afterward, he did not resign, but delegated the rule after him to the Minister of Interior (and you could call this the “mysterious security black box”), who was the figure Zakaria Mohieddin.
Popular demonstrations erupted (some of which were undoubtedly manufactured), demanding that Abdel Nasser remain. So Abdel Nasser stayed, as if responding to the will of the people, and naturally used this opportunity to eliminate other leaders. He killed his friend, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, the army commander, and announced he had committed suicide. He also hunted down Amer’s men in the government and the army, reshaped the military leadership, and titled this policy “eliminating the effects of the aggression”.
Meanwhile, Israel had completed the occupation of Sinai and benefited from the presence of the Suez Canal, remaining behind it (the Suez Canal acts as a water barrier, a difficult and exposed water barrier). They stayed behind it and built an earth berm on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal; this acted as another barrier. Behind this earth berm, they established a heavily military defense line, known as the “Bar Lev Line”, named after its engineer (the Israeli military engineer who designed it). Therefore, the situation regarding Sinai became extremely difficult: facing you is a water barrier, then a earth berm, then a defensive line.
The Illusions of Unprepared Armies
While the 1948 Nakba was harsh, violent, and shocking, it could be argued that it was somewhat expected due to the preceding British groundwork and foreign dominance over Arab states. The Arab armies at that time were small, poorly equipped, and subject to foreign influence or even led by foreign commanders. However, the catastrophe that occurred in 1967 was on another level entirely; it was a thunderbolt, shockingly severe in a different way, because no one anticipated it. These Arab countries had gained independence—formally, at least, with local leadership and nationalistic faces. They raised the banners of Arab nationalism and practically handed leadership to Abdel Nasser.
Abdel Nasser and his media apparatus spoke endlessly about the Arabs’ responsibility to liberate Palestine. The Egyptian media broadcasted a highly dangerous narrative about Egypt’s supposed supernatural military capabilities, boasting of advanced missiles (Al-Nasser, Al-Zafer, and Al-Qaher), claiming Egypt had entered the space age, and making other grandiose assertions. No one imagined a catastrophe like this could occur, especially not with such speed; it was as if the army, weapons, and equipment simply evaporated and turned to ash. The very enemy that people expected to be expelled from Tel Aviv was suddenly stationed just two hours away from Cairo.
On the Syrian front, the Golan Heights were also occupied with ease, despite being an elevated plateau that would be nearly impossible to conquer if a military force possessed even the slightest degree of readiness and vigilance. In that engagement, one thousand Syrian soldiers were killed. Naturally, the question of “How did the Golan fall?” remains a subject full of extensive details, often raising the question of how it was politically sold. Militarily, its fall in such a manner was near impossible, but as this is a brief summary, detailed exploration is not feasible here.
The Fall of Jerusalem and Jordanian Complacency
In Jordan, the excellent and distinct relationship between king Hussein and both the Israelis and the Americans prevented the king from harboring any ill thoughts about his allies. It has been noted that secret meetings had already commenced between king Hussein and Zionist leaders. At that time, mere secret meetings were considered high treason and a grave taboo that no one dared to even consider, unlike the situation today.
However, the relationship was incredibly strong, mirroring the historical ties between his grandfather, king AbduLLAH I, and the Israelis. This relationship reached such a level of strength that Israel actually informed king Hussein of its plans for the fifth of June, 1967, and he kept their secret, revealing it to no one.
Yet, when Israel swiftly concluded its operations on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts with ease, by the middle of that very day (the fifth of June), it also invaded the West Bank, which was under Jordanian sovereignty. Israel preserved no friendship, pact, or dignity for the king. It could even be suggested that a prior agreement existed between the two parties. While this is a perspective noted by some historians and does not need to be fully adopted here, it is not far-fetched or surprising; an analysis of political maneuvering, particularly the nature of Jordanian politics, makes such a scenario plausible.
In any case, this invasion resulted in the deaths of more than six thousand Jordanian soldiers, establishing the Jordan River as the dividing line between Jordan and Israel. Through this invasion, the aspirations of the late king AbduLLAH and his grandson king Hussein to expand Jordan’s borders—chasing the old dream of Sharif Hussein—were buried forever.
Thus, the catastrophe occurred: Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam, fell into the hands of the Zionist occupation. As Ahmad al-Shuqayri stated, “Jerusalem fell intact without a fight or defense“. A similar sentiment was expressed by Sheikh AbduLLAH Azzam, may ALLAH have mercy on him, who noted that this happened “without even ten young men or Jordanian soldiers being killed around Al-Aqsa“. This was the magnitude of the great disaster that struck in the year ’67.
The Alteration of Jerusalem and Ideological Collapse
Israel occupied the entirety of Jerusalem, having seized the entire West Bank, and consequently initiated its program to dominate the city. Israel swiftly demolished the Moroccan Quarter (Harat al-Maghariba) in Jerusalem, a neighborhood directly adjacent to Al-Aqsa Mosque. Just six days after the war began (on June 11), the Moroccan Quarter was blown up, its residents were urgently expelled, and the area was transformed into a plaza for Jewish worship in front of the Buraq Wall (which they call the Wailing Wall). The empty space seen in photographs today in front of the Buraq Wall was once the famous, ancient, historical Moroccan Quarter at Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Twelve days later (on June 27, 1967), Israel declared Jerusalem a unified city under Israeli sovereignty. Subsequently, it began a rapid and systematic construction of new Jewish settlements in areas of East Jerusalem. The authorities started confiscating or even demolishing historical and archaeological Islamic buildings, and initiated the construction of new synagogues directly adjacent to Al-Aqsa Mosque.
More dangerously, a program of excavations beneath Al-Aqsa Mosque commenced at that time, an initiative that continues to expand and now poses a genuine threat of collapsing the mosque. The walls and foundations have already been compromised by the expansion of these excavation projects beneath the holy site. Anyone reviewing this issue through video archives can see how cracks have appeared in the walls of Al-Aqsa. Furthermore, two years later, another grave incident occurred with the serious attempt to burn down Al-Aqsa Mosque on August 21, 1969. The images of this arson are infamous, and among the irreplaceable items destroyed was the historic pulpit (Minbar) of Nur ad-Din Zengi, may ALLAH have mercy on him.
Reflecting on the aftermath and consequences of this Nakba, it becomes evident that it triggered a massive ideological collapse: the fall of Arab nationalism and Nasserism. It is a natural pattern that ideologies spread and gain traction when they achieve military victories, just as they recede and suffer defeat when broken in battle. Any major triumph or devastating loss is followed by an ideological wave that resonates with the battle’s outcome.
Consequently, this military defeat dealt a fatal blow to the dominant ideologies of the time. The catastrophe marked the beginning of the dissipation of Nasserist, nationalist, and communist thoughts that had pervaded Egypt and most Arab nations during the 1960s. Some scholars recognized this underlying reality; a famous account details how Sheikh Al-Shaarawi, may ALLAH have mercy on him, prostrated in gratitude to ALLAH when this defeat occurred, realizing it shattered these deceptive secular ideologies.
The Bitter Fruits of the Catastrophe
Some might find this reaction surprising, but it must be stated that the era prior to the 1967 war witnessed a massive and blatant spread of disbelief, prominently featured in official state media. This was coupled with the dominance of communism and a massive wave of moral decay and promiscuity. An observer of the Arab world at that time might have assumed that Islam had been eradicated from the region entirely.
To illustrate the sheer volume of such rhetoric before the defeat: an individual named Ibrahim Ikhlas wrote in the Syrian Army newspaper just one month before the catastrophe, stating, “ALLAH, capitalism, imperialism, and all the values that prevailed in the previous society have become mummified dolls in the museums of history”. At that time, merely carrying an Islamic book was treated as a crime even in the eyes of society. The public was deeply infatuated with Abdel Nasser, elevated by the Egyptian media to a near-mythical status, a delusion that still lingers among older generations decades after his death.
Among the most critical consequences resulting from this second Nakba regarding the history of Palestine were several key outcomes.
- First, the idol of Nasserism and secular Arab nationalism shattered and collapsed, allowing Islamic ideas to re-emerge, particularly in Egypt and the Levant. Whoever read and followed the memoirs of those who lived through this period sees that the setback (Naksa) was a massive turning point toward Islamic ideas.
- Second, a profound sense of betrayal and deception solidified among Palestinians, as the total loss of their lands was finalized under the watch of the very Arab forces that had oppressed them while falsely promising imminent liberation and imminent return to their homes lost in ’48. A genuine conviction began to form that there was no hope in these Arab regimes, nor even in Arab Nationalism as a whole.
- Third, this despair injected new life into the strictly Palestinian national movement, pushing Palestinians to embrace resistance factions that took upon themselves the burden of confronting the occupation. Movements began forming from the year ’57 (the Fatah movement), and after that, its first operation was in December ’64 or January ’65. Some people expected that these factions were useless, and that the premise was the Arab armies were about to storm Israel. After the 1967 war, it became starkly clear that hope lay solely with these Palestinian factions.
- Fourth, for the first time, the Egyptian authority and other Arab regimes began to pursue cooperation with the Palestinian resistance movement, moving past earlier phases of rejection and attempts at infiltration (for whoever reads the memoirs of the founders of Fatah will find how the Egyptian authority first met them with repulsion, and how it tried to infiltrate them). Other Arab authorities also began opening the door to cooperation with these Palestinian organizations, while naturally, other regimes remained in their state of apprehension or hostility toward the Palestinian resistance.
Conversely, Israel achieved certain gains during this war, and it can be definitively stated that these were absolute and decisive. It can even be argued that the strategic advantages secured in the 1967 catastrophe were in no way less significant than the foundational gains achieved when the state was established in 1948. In reality, the 1967 war represented the absolute zenith of Israeli power and the peak of its military ascent in the Middle Eastern region.
- Firstly, while it is true that Israel was initially established under British sponsorship and with colonial support, it demonstrated that it could independently grow, ascend, expand, and conquer without needing to rely directly on a global superpower in the heat of battle. This self-reliance was an extremely decisive strategic victory.
- Secondly, if the idea of Israel’s existence or its long-term survival was a matter of doubt between 1948 and 1967, that uncertainty was completely erased. Back in 1948, many people, including some Israelis themselves, did not believe a small entity could survive surrounded by a hostile Arab environment. However, it proved in this war that it was a state fully capable of growth and expansion, establishing itself as a reliable entity for forming political, economic, or military alliances with both the Western and Eastern blocs. Thus, the question of its precarious existence was settled; it had become an expanding force capable of defeating its surroundings.
Shifting the Political Paradigm and Regional Power Dynamics
Israel successfully consolidated the territorial gains it had acquired in the 1948 conflict and the 1956 Suez Crisis. Following the 1967 war, no one in the corridors of international politics spoke anymore about dismantling the state of Israel. Instead, political demands—even up to the present moment—merely urge Israel to return to the borders of June 4, 1967. Every diplomatic effort expended since then has been merely an attempt to revert to the pre-1967 status quo, effectively granting full international recognition of what was taken in 1948.
Consequently, Israel transformed into the undisputed primary power in the region. It demonstrated the capability to invade multiple surrounding countries simultaneously in a matter of a single day. By doing so, it positioned itself as the sole, reliable ally upon which global powers could place their bets. Before 1967, reviewing the memoirs and archives of the American administration reveals a division among officials: should the United States bet on Israel, or should it rely on other regional regimes like Egypt, Turkey, or Iran?
This hesitation existed because Israel, regardless of the support it enjoyed, remained a Western entity forcibly planted in an Arab region that fundamentally rejected it. This artificial implantation was viewed as detrimental to long-term and medium-term Western interests, making Israel a risky primary ally.
From an American perspective before the 1967 war, Israel appeared unstable and incapable of acting as a long-term partner. Consequently, consideration was given to other nations in the region. At that time, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran were subordinate to American influence, and each possessed ambitions to become the paramount regional power. Each of these three nations possessed vast populations, massive resources, and expansive territories—metrics that Israel simply could not match. Any of these countries could have presented itself as the most useful and capable guardian of American interests.
However, the devastating outcome of this war definitively cut off this path for those regional powers. It blocked any Arab or Muslim nation from serving as a competitor for Western reliance. It became the state capable of imposing its will, firmly establishing itself as the premier military and strategic force in the Middle East.
Demographic Consequences and Palestinian Steadfastness
This devastating war resulted in the displacement of an additional three hundred thousand Palestinians, distinct from the eight hundred thousand who were expelled during the first catastrophe in 1948. While three hundred thousand is not a small number—it is indeed a massive and tragic figure—it must be contextualized. When compared to the sheer scale of the 1948 displacement, and factoring in the passage of time and natural population growth over two decades, this figure is proportionately lower.
The collective memory of the Palestinian people played a crucial role in this demographic outcome. During the first catastrophe, many Palestinians drew upon their experiences from World War I. When battles occurred between the Ottomans and the British, civilians temporarily vacated their villages due to the fighting and returned once the conflict ended. In 1948, they mistakenly believed that by leaving temporarily—until the Arab armies defeated the Zionist militias—they would soon return home.
However, by the time of 1967, the Palestinian collective memory had fully absorbed the bitter lessons of the first Nakba. They understood that the Jews intended to seize the land, permanently expel its inhabitants, and replace them. They knew that those who left their homes never returned. Consequently, a vast number of Palestinians became resolute, clinging to their lands, villages, and cities, and absolutely refused to leave.
Another factor was that Israel did not execute systematic displacement and replacement operations during this war (the 1967 war) in the exact same manner it did in 1948. The military expansion was overwhelmingly rapid and vast. In a single day, the occupation forces seized the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula—enormous territories relative to Israel’s size. This sudden expansion outpaced their demographic and logistical capacity to systematically expel the population in a carefully orchestrated, step-by-step manner as seen in the first Nakba. Therefore, the number of displaced individuals was significantly less when compared to the systemic conditions of 1948.
The Intelligence Disaster and the Suppression of Resistance
The most valuable prize Israel acquired from Gaza and the West Bank was the complete archives of the Egyptian and Jordanian security apparatuses. It is a known fact that both the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes had been actively tracking and pursuing individuals who resisted Israel. They operated prisons, conducted interrogations under torture, and maintained extensive intelligence files. The most devastating acquisition for Israel was these security archives, which contained comprehensive lists of resistance fighters’ names and the heroes of guerrilla operations. This intelligence windfall was one of the most dangerous losses, severely crippling the resistance in the post-1967 era and delivering countless individuals directly into Israeli hands.
Furthermore, the general state of despair, the widespread collapse of morale, and the highly sensitive information that fell into Israeli possession created an extremely weak psychological and spiritual environment. It was an environment where the population had already been broken under the oppressive weight of the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes. The capacity to resist had been systematically stripped away. Under these harsh conditions—where Islamic movements were heavily persecuted and suppressed—a psychological profile emerged among some individuals that made them susceptible to recruitment and collaboration. The absence of Islamic awareness, compounded by dire psychological, economic, and military conditions made the environment for sustaining resistance incredibly difficult.
Gradually, using a combination of enticement, intimidation, military force, and security measures, Israel managed to dominate the remaining resistance cells within the occupied territories. It can be accurately stated that by the year 1973, Israel had effectively extinguished the active pockets of resistance that existed in Gaza and the West Bank.
It is due to this monumental series of failures and unintentional aids to the enemy that the historian Professor Jalal Kishk critically suggested a massive statue of Jamal Abdel Nasser should be erected—but inside Israel. Because without Abdel Nasser, Israel would never have achieved the unprecedented heights of power it reached.
In the next article, ALLAH willing, the narration of this story will be continued: What will happen? And what will the Palestinians do after the occurrence of this great Nakba?
We ask ALLAH, the Blessed and Exalted, to teach us what benefits us, to benefit us with what HE has taught us, and to increase us in knowledge. Peace, Mercy, and Blessings of ALLAH be upon you.
Sources:
Mohamed Elhamy. قصة فلسطين | 16. النكبة الكبرى 1967.. وضياع المسجد الأقصى الشريف!!. Telegram Video.
