Table of Contents
This seventeenth installment explores the critical transitional period following the 1967 defeat, leading up to the 1973 October War. Having previously examined the catastrophic events of the Six-Day War and the ideological collapse of Arab Nationalism, this article shifts focus to the military and political maneuvers that followed. It exposes the realities of the War of Attrition, the strategic calculations behind the 1973 October War, and how Anwar Sadat’s sudden pivot toward Arab normalization and the Camp David Accords effectively neutralized regional military threats to Israel, leaving the Palestinian resistance isolated on the front lines.
In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All Praise is due to ALLAH and Peace and Blessings be upon the Messenger of ALLAH, His family, His companions, and those who align with Him.
Welcome to a new article in the “The Story of Palestine“, a series that briefly recounts the history of Palestine from the inception of the idea of a Jewish return up to the outbreak of the Flood in October 2023. The objective is to understand the roots of this enduring conflict, examining why it remains an inflamed issue today, how Theodor Herzl succeeded where his predecessors failed for three thousand years, and what the future holds according to the Quran, the Sunnah, and unfolding events.
For those wishing to verify the information presented, these articles are extracted from my book “Summary of the Story of Palestine“1; and a download link is available for referencing the original sources.
The previous article concluded with the second major catastrophe to befall the Arabs and Muslims: the 1967 defeat. During that time, the entirety of Jerusalem fell, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and Israel simultaneously invaded multiple Arab countries, emerging as the strongest power in the region. Following this, resistance movements emerged, and intermittent military skirmishes began along the Suez Canal between Egyptian and Israeli forces, which became known as the War of Attrition.
In reality, these were merely skirmishes, and the term “War of Attrition” arguably overstated their scale. Nevertheless, Israel was able to reach deep into Egyptian territory, bombing areas as far as the extreme south. Simultaneously, certain Egyptian units executed highly dangerous special operations behind Israeli lines. Ultimately, these clashes did not alter the strategic landscape significantly and concluded when Gamal Abdel Nasser accepted the “Rogers Plan” (proposed by the US Secretary of State at the time) for a ceasefire. Months later, Abdel Nasser passed away, and his vice president, Anwar Sadat, assumed power.
The Prelude and Eruption of the 1973 October War
At this juncture, the country entered a state commonly referred to as “no peace, no war.” Abdel Nasser died relatively young and unexpectedly in 1970 following an Arab summit. Upon taking office, Sadat spent the first three years consolidating his grip on power. He successfully dismantled the Nasserist power centers during what was termed the “Corrective Revolution” in 1971, a strategic move that allowed him to replace the old guard with his own loyalists.
Three years later, the Egyptian army launched an offensive into the Sinai Peninsula, successfully crossing the Suez Canal. Units were deployed to the eastern bank, and air defense equipment was moved to the canal’s edge, enabling the military to secure a strip of land ten to fifteen kilometers wide. Concurrently, Syrian forces launched an attack on the Golan Heights front, achieving surprising preliminary advancements.
However, the Israelis swiftly regained control of the situation, particularly on the Syrian front. They managed to repel the Syrian forces, pursued them, and recaptured the lost positions. Israeli aircraft penetrated deep into Syrian territory, bombing areas in Damascus. Consequently, the Syrian front quickly reverted to its previous state, or perhaps worse, as the road to Damascus lay open, leaving it uncertain how far the Israeli advance would continue.
The Military Reversal and the Ceasefire
On the Egyptian front, the plan proceeded as designed for the first six days. The Egyptian army held its liberated positions east of the Suez Canal without advancing further. This restraint was intentional, as the underlying strategy relied on the premise that Israel could not sustain a prolonged conflict. A lengthy war would drain Israeli civilian energy and paralyze its economy and society. Furthermore, the vast expanse of the Sinai Peninsula offered no hiding places for the Israeli military; if they failed to hold the entire peninsula, they would be forced to withdraw, or, as General Saad el-Shazly described it, “fall like a rotten fruit“.
After these initial days, however, disruptions and collapses began to unfold. Sadat made a fateful decision—against the advice of military leadership—to push the army deeper into Sinai. Advancing meant moving beyond the protective umbrella of the air defense systems, which were stationed west of the canal and only covered a range of ten to fifteen kilometers. Despite the outright rejection of this order by military commanders, Sadat insisted. Once the Egyptian forces advanced beyond the air defense cover, they became exposed to Israeli airstrikes. In a single day, the Egyptian army lost more than half of its tanks—two hundred and fifty out of four hundred—in an event that came to be known as the “Tank Massacre”.
More critically, this deeper incursion created a gap within the Egyptian ranks. An Israeli division exploited this opening, crossing to the western bank of the Suez Canal and encircling the Egyptian Third Army stationed in the southern sector of Sinai. With the Israeli army now positioned west of the canal, the road to Cairo was effectively open. Consequently, the initial victories morphed into a severe military setback. At this point, the United States intervened heavily to impose a ceasefire, thereby concluding the combat operations on the Egyptian front.
Analyzing the Outcomes and True Motives Behind the 1973 October War
At best, the outcome of the 1973 October War could be described as a military draw. Without exaggeration or pessimism, it can also be argued that the conflict ended in a defeat for the Egyptian army, as Israel absorbed the initial shock and regained the initiative. Unfortunately, a widespread belief persists among Egyptians that they achieved an absolute victory, which contradicts historical realities. Despite the publication of numerous memoirs by key military commanders—such as Chief of Staff Saad el-Shazly, Chief of Operations Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, and the commanders of the Second and Third Armies—no serious military study concludes that the war ended in an absolute Egyptian triumph.
This narrative of total victory is solely the product of the Egyptian media. Through relentless promotion, it has solidified into a firm conviction across a broad spectrum of the Egyptian populace, including, regrettably, many intellectuals and political elites. Nevertheless, foreign sources and references remain accessible. Anyone analyzing military assessments of the 1973 October War outside the heavy influence of the Egyptian media will find that the conflict was not a definitive triumph; it is most accurately described as a stalemate, a partial military success, or even a tactical defeat for the Egyptian forces.
The events following the October War led many observers to question Sadat’s true objectives, plans, and intentions. Did he genuinely intend to launch a war of liberation to reclaim the land, only to be surprised by Israeli resilience and American support, thus forcing a retreat and a plea for peace? Or did he, from the very beginning, design the war merely as a “war of movement” to break the stalemate of “no peace, no war”? Was the goal simply to secure enough of a perceived victory to gain the political legitimacy needed to initiate a peace and normalization process with Israel?
The Evidence of a Pre-Planned Political Strategy
This remains a point of contention among historians, though evidence continues to mount suggesting that Sadat indeed intended the war strictly as a “war of movement”. It appears it was utilized as a mechanism and a gateway to establish peace with Israel. One of the most prominent pieces of evidence is the testimony of several commanders from the October War, who noted that before the conflict, Sadat told them, “I only want you to liberate ten centimeters east of the Suez Canal for me, and leave the rest to me”.
This statement was documented by Lieutenant General Mohamed Fawzi, who served as the Minister of War at the beginning of Sadat’s era, in his memoirs, and corroborated by other commanders. The phrase “ten centimeters” indicates a premeditated intention—or a broader political plan—to merely shift the stagnant situation as a prelude to a peace initiative following the war. Non-military figures who met with Sadat, such as Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), a founder of Fatah, also recorded similar statements in their memoirs, confirming Sadat’s limited territorial ambitions aimed solely at altering the political dynamics east of the canal.
A second piece of evidence is that Sadat mentioned a peace initiative and expressed his readiness to visit Israel before the tide of battle had even turned. At a moment when all observers were eagerly anticipating further Egyptian military advances—with pessimists expecting the liberation of Sinai and optimists hoping for the liberation of Jerusalem—Sadat shocked everyone by preemptively offering peace and proposing a visit to Israel.
Unprecedented Concessions and the Shift to Arab Normalization
The third piece of evidence lies in Anwar Sadat’s behavior during the negotiation phases and the unreasonable concessions he offered. At Camp David, two foreign ministers resigned, along with several other officials, due to Sadat’s incomprehensible insistence on finalizing the agreement. This does not imply that these ministers were fundamentally opposed to the concept of peace; rather, the sheer magnitude of the concessions Sadat made indicated an inexplicable determination to conclude the treaty at any cost, regardless of what transpired.
Sadat frequently utilized his familiar rhetoric, declaring that the October War would be the “last of the wars”. Stating that a conflict is the absolute final war while actively engaged in diplomatic negotiations inherently projects weakness and severely damages a nation’s political negotiating position.
The fourth point of consideration is that Sadat remained entirely detached, actively ignoring and bypassing all Israeli political and military violations during the negotiation phases and in the period that followed. These blatant violations included the military bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the provocative declaration of Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel.
All these events were highly embarrassing for an Egyptian leader who continuously claimed that peace was the gateway to prosperity for the Arab world, and that relations with Israel would ultimately benefit other Arab and Palestinian causes. While swallowing these political insults and embarrassments from Israel, Sadat simultaneously dealt with other Arab nations with extreme arrogance, condescension, and haughtiness.
The fifth piece of evidence is the profound internal transformation Sadat initiated within Egypt. While Abdel Nasser, in his later years, leaned heavily toward the Soviet Union and the spread of communist ideologies, Sadat steered Egyptian society aggressively back toward Westernization—politically, economically, and culturally. He was exceptionally keen on and deeply attached to ensuring that Egypt remained firmly within the Western geopolitical camp.
These historical factors stand as the strongest indicators that the October War was merely a highly orchestrated means and a political pretext to introduce Israel into the Arab world in a manner that appeared honorable rather than humiliating. This analytical perspective was thoroughly documented by the renowned American historian Ira M. Lapidus in his book A History of Islamic Societies. It was also explicitly referenced by the second Israeli ambassador to Egypt, Moshe Sasson. In his book Seven Years in the Land of the Egyptians, Sasson noted that it would have been entirely impossible for Sadat to pursue peace without first securing the “image of victory” provided by the October War.
These intricate details and documented realities were recognized early on by individuals endowed with deep insight, such as Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, as well as other notable figures like Sheikh Rifa’i Taha.
The result of the October War at its best is that it is half a military victory turned by politics into a complete defeat. And with this, Israel exited “nominally” from Sinai (as the Israelis still have privileges in entering it) to enter Cairo from the “gate of peace”. At that time, the popular conscience thought that the battle of 73 was the battle of liberating Palestine; as if the people did not feel that Sinai was the occupied one, but rather they felt that Palestine was the occupied one.
The Marginalized Role of the Palestinian Resistance and Previous Peace Attempts
It is highly common for the significant contribution of the Palestinian resistance in the October War to be entirely overlooked in mainstream historical narratives. The active participation of the fedayeen (freedom fighters) may not have been highly visible amid the overwhelming noise of conventional state armies, but it was structurally vital. Both Anwar Sadat and Syria’s Hafez al-Assad were eager to utilize the kinetic energy of the fedayeen organized under the “Palestine Liberation Army”, which served as the quasi-military wing initially formed by the Palestine Liberation Organization. There was active and deliberate coordination between Sadat and the PLO leadership. During that period, the fedayeen successfully executed approximately one hundred daring operations on the Golan and Upper Galilee military fronts.
Attempts were also made to coordinate resistance efforts with Jordan, but king Hussein stubbornly insisted on keeping his borders quiet, even though the West Bank had been militarily occupied from his control just years prior. He explicitly refused to permit any fedayeen movements from his borders—a rigid stance detailed extensively in the memoirs of Salah Khalaf. This refusal was not surprising, as it was entirely consistent with king Hussein’s established political posture. For the Palestinians, the major shock was not merely the cessation of this war at a military stalemate, but rather Sadat’s sudden, unilateral pivot toward peace, alongside his unwavering insistence on executing it.
Looking back at previous historical attempts to establish peace with Israel reveals that Sadat’s endeavor was not entirely unprecedented in the region. Earlier, in 1949, Husni al-Zaim in Syria attempted to forge a peace agreement and delineate borders with Israel, but David Ben-Gurion firmly rejected it, harboring ambitious desires to seize the entirety of the Sea of Galilee. Another early attempt was made by the Egyptian regime during the era of King Farouk, shortly after the 1948 ceasefire.
Although discussing peace at that specific time was socially equated with high treason, the underlying political atmosphere was heavily saturated with the concept. Evidence of this atmosphere can be seen in the early warnings issued in 1953 by prominent Islamic figures. Sayyid Qutb explicitly stated in a lecture in noble Jerusalem that liberation should not be expected from Arab state armies. At that exact same conference, Mahmud al-Sawwaf, the General Supervisor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq, fiercely declared that any hand extended in peace to Israel would be severed. The diplomatic discourse of peace was leaking from these regimes to such an extent that Islamic scholars and leaders felt compelled to adopt this severe, cautionary tone.
The Camp David Accords and the Disastrous Impact on Palestine
While Sadat was not the absolute first to seek a public peace agreement with Israel, he was undeniably the first to successfully complete this specific trajectory. It is crucial to remember that secret, back-channel relations between Israel and various regional leaders were deeply long-standing. Examples include the covert diplomatic ties maintained by king AbduLLAH of Jordan and his grandson king Hussein, as well as the Moroccan king Hassan II and the powerful strongman of his regime, General Mohamed Oufkir.
These secret relationships existed well before Camp David, but Sadat achieved formal public peace and explicit public normalization. While previous Arab leaders who proposed peace failed due to intense Israeli stubbornness, Israel’s violent invasion of Arab states in 1967 had only exacerbated the geopolitical situation. This invasion generated overwhelming popular rejection, solidifying Israel’s status as an eternal enemy that the regional masses yearned to fight.
The perceived military achievement of the October War was rhetorically intended to prove that usurped territorial rights could only be restored through sheer force. Thus, Sadat’s subsequent speech initiating peace and declaring his readiness to personally visit Israel struck as a shocking, paralyzing surprise and an explosive political revelation to everyone involved. He justified his controversial position by claiming a total inability to fight the United States, asserting that America held 99% of the geopolitical playing cards.
Completely ignoring all potential internal societal backlash and external regional opposition, he proceeded steadfastly down the path of peace. He went so far as to dismiss all the leading military figures who had successfully participated in the October War. A long series of meetings and intense negotiations subsequently commenced, culminating in the highly controversial Camp David Accords in 1978 and the signing of the formal peace treaty in 1979.
The essence of this bilateral agreement and treaty concerning the future of Palestine manifested in several devastatingly strategic ways.
- First, the Sinai Peninsula was severely demilitarized: It was stripped of any armed military presence capable of launching an offensive strike against Israel, with Egypt only permitted to retain highly limited forces equipped with light weaponry. A close examination of troop deployments on both sides of the new border clearly shows that Israel’s ability to swiftly re-occupy Sinai vastly outweighs the Egyptians’ capacity to mount a defense. In reality, Sinai was transformed into a massive buffer zone protecting Israel, leaving Egyptian territory highly vulnerable to future Israeli incursions.
- Second, the historic treaty formally empowered Israelis to enter Sinai without a required visa—a specific privilege ironically denied to the vast majority of Egyptian citizens, who face significant bureaucratic hurdles to access that region of their own country.
- Third, the establishment of natural diplomatic relations began with the exchange of official ambassadors. This opened the floodgates for deep economic and cultural ties, as well as extensive security and military cooperation, which has reached unprecedented heights today under the current rule of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Sadat was assassinated precisely two years after officially signing the peace treaty. His immediate successor, Hosni Mubarak, faithfully continued the foundational policy of cementing this peace. He maintained this posture despite all blatant Israeli violations of the treaty and Israel’s aggressive military rampages across the region—such as the devastating invasion of Beirut and the brutal military handling of various Palestinian uprisings and wars. Mubarak ruled Egypt with an iron fist for thirty years, during which formal peace with Israel transformed into a deeply entrenched and unshakeable state policy that no one within the ruling regime ever considered revising.
The most dangerous and lasting consequence of this Egyptian-Israeli normalization was Egypt’s total withdrawal from the broader battle for Palestine. The Egyptian state officially shed the traditional mantle of Arabism and collective nationalistic slogans, donning instead the highly insular cloak of strict “state patriotism”. The regime declared that the Palestinian cause was strictly a local Palestinian issue, stating that Egypt had successfully resolved its own territorial problems and that the Palestinians were now entirely on their own to solve theirs.
The Three Paths of Normalization and Regional Power Shifts
Therefore, in analyzing modern history, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between three distinct geopolitical paths of normalization between Arab states and Israel.
- The first path is explicit public normalization, exactly as it occurred in Egypt.
- The second path involves unannounced, highly secret relations, which have been and remain ongoing between various Arab intelligence regimes and Israel.
- The third path consists of public political calls for a permanent and comprehensive regional peace, strictly conditioned upon Israel’s full withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders.
The specific path of public normalization inaugurated by Sadat became incredibly slow and hesitant due to his shocking assassination on October 6, 1981, executed by Islamists within the Egyptian army. This violent assassination deeply terrified any Arab monarch or president contemplating a formal peace with Israel, effectively derailing the train of public normalization for the next forty years. The assassination severely hindered the overall speed of Egyptian normalization, functionally confining it strictly to the political and official elite levels without allowing it to deeply permeate the popular consciousness or broad economic spheres. It also significantly slowed the pace of visible security and military cooperation.
The only notable regional exception was Jordan, which formally entered into a recognition and peace treaty with Israel in 1994, thirteen years after Sadat’s death. Yet, even Jordan’s “public” normalization remained trembling, highly hesitant, and strictly restricted to the elite political and security levels, while its public and media discourse hypocritically continued to voice support for Palestinian rights.
Over forty years later, a massive new wave of normalization emerged under the banner of the Abraham Accords. This dramatic shift occurred following the total fracturing and defeat of the Arab Spring revolutions. It began formally with the United Arab Emirates, and was rapidly followed by Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.
Strong and frequent diplomatic discussions also surround potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, given the latter’s immense wealth, religious influence, and significant regional power. Saudi normalization would undoubtedly pull many other hesitant Arab and Islamic nations onto this diplomatic train; however, as of the writing of this text, it has not yet formally materialized.
Meanwhile, the unannounced secret relations have continued entirely unabated in the dark corridors of regional politics. These covert ties are particularly strong between Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and numerous other countries—including the UAE long before its public normalization—a geopolitical reality that is exceedingly well-known to astute political observers.
As for the third path—the public calls for comprehensive peace conditioned strictly on a return to the 1967 borders—this strategy began shortly after Egypt’s normalization. It was initiated by prince Fahd bin AbdulAziz (then Crown prince of Saudi Arabia) in 1981. It was viewed as a shocking proposal at the time because it officially opened the diplomatic door to recognizing Israel and formally conceding the vast territories it had violently seized in 1948; demanding a return to the 1967 borders inherently means permanently surrendering everything taken prior to that date.
Known broadly as the “Fahd Initiative”, it was presented at two major Arab summits in Fez, Morocco, in 1981 and 1982, receiving majority state support to officially become an “Arab Initiative”. It ultimately stalled for one very simple reason: Israel entirely ignored it. Over twenty years later, king AbduLLAH reintroduced the exact same framework at the 2003 Beirut Summit, where it again received unanimous Arab state support, and once again, Israel arrogantly rejected it.
The Orphanhood of Palestine and the Unyielding Spirit of Resistance
The complex file of peace and normalization is vast, but the primary concern remains its profound, devastating impact on the Palestinian cause. From a purely mathematical perspective, Egypt is just one of twenty-three recognized Arab countries. However, in stark geopolitical reality, Egypt represents a full quarter of the Arab world’s population and historically stands as its strongest military power. Its official withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli conflict does not merely equal the exit of one minor state; it equates to the catastrophic loss of a quarter of the total Arab military and political strength.
This structural significance is heavily magnified by its direct geographical proximity to Palestine and Israel, making its strategic value in this struggle equivalent to three-quarters of the Arab power, if not more. Egypt alone possesses a population size and military strength significantly greater than the rest of the immediate confrontation states combined. Even viewed through a narrow, secular patriotic lens entirely devoid of religious duty or Arab solidarity, Palestine remains a highly sensitive “national security” issue for the Egyptian state. Therefore, Sadat’s unilateral move toward an isolated peace was a violent, paralyzing shock to the entire Arab world, and most particularly to the Palestinians.
Before Camp David, virtually no one imagined such a catastrophic diplomatic betrayal could occur. Salah Khalaf notably recorded in his memoirs prior to normalization that no Arab state could ever agree to a settlement without the Palestinians, nor could they ever endorse a settlement explicitly against them. After normalization became a reality, he starkly observed that the October War, for both the Palestinians and the broader Arab nation, was merely a short-lived, deceptive illusion. Instead of paving a clear way for the liberation of occupied territories, it deeply entrenched American influence and actively facilitated regional conspiracies designed to completely dismantle the Palestinian resistance.
Sadat’s unilateral peace also triggered a massive geopolitical resurgence for Israel, fully empowering it to act aggressively and unilaterally throughout the region. Following this wave of normalization, a violent attempt was made to blow up the Al-Aqsa Mosque on May 1, 1980. Israel arrogantly declared Jerusalem its “eternal, undivided capital”, firmly embedding this claim as an unamendable constitutional law on July 30, 1980. It audaciously bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981—just three days after Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin held a friendly meeting with Sadat in Sharm El-Sheikh. In 1982, Israel launched a massive invasion of Lebanon, reaching all the way to the capital city of Beirut.
Israel orchestrated and facilitated a series of horrific massacres against Palestinian refugees, either directly or through its Maronite Christian militia allies. The absolute most horrific of these was the Sabra and Shatila massacre in September 1982, which brutally claimed the lives of three thousand defenseless Palestinians. The well-known Saudi minister Ghazi Al-Gosaibi wrote clearly in his memoirs that the Lebanon crisis definitively proved the Arab nation could not enter any meaningful military confrontation with Israel without Egypt’s backing. Neutralizing Egypt served as the ultimate “green light” that allowed Israel to rampage freely and violently across the Middle East.
Most dangerously, the Egyptian regime took absolutely no substantial political or military action to deter the Israelis. The Israeli ambassador to Egypt, Moshe Sasson, was pleasantly surprised to find that the maximum Egyptian diplomatic response to the horrific Sabra and Shatila massacre was merely recalling the Egyptian ambassador from Israel. This token gesture was accompanied by a reassuring back-channel message to the Americans guaranteeing there would be no further escalation.
Even the Gaza Strip, which the Zionists had militarily occupied directly from Egyptian administrative control, was no longer viewed by the Egyptian regime as its historical responsibility to liberate, despite Egypt’s blunders being the direct cause of its loss. Instead, it was entirely abandoned and categorized as a strictly Palestinian issue.
Palestine was deeply plunged into a tragic state of “orphanhood”, brutally stripped away from the broader Arab and Islamic nation. The timeline of this abandonment is clear: Since the British occupation, Mustafa Kemal abolished the Islamic Caliphate, discarded global Islamic affiliation, and renounced all responsibility for liberating Palestine. This religious responsibility was scattered, leaving individual nation-states feeling entirely unaccountable. Then came the era of Arab nationalist regimes, offering Palestine nothing but empty speeches and hollow slogans, actively refusing to allow the formation of an independent Palestinian government, and ultimately handing Gaza and the West Bank over to the Zionists in 1967.
Finally, the modern regimes of normalization emerged, formally abandoning Palestine to the brutal occupation and permanently washing their hands of the cause entirely. This is the sanitized conclusion drawn from public history; however, a deep, objective dive into the historical archives and eyewitness memoirs reveals a darker truth. Palestine did not fall merely through “betrayal” in the passive sense of abandonment. It fell through “treason” characterized by active collusion, complicity, and deliberate conspiracy with the Zionists. Arab regimes willingly bought the security of their own thrones by actively selling out Palestine, and sometimes even sacrificing parts of their own sovereign countries.
Today, the Israelis find themselves in an excellent strategic position, aggressively expanding illegal settlements and deeply entrenching the Jewish presence in both Gaza and the West Bank. A massive, systematic wave of Israeli expropriation of Palestinian land, water, and vital resources ensued. Palestinians were economically strangled, left with no viable recourse but to work as cheap labor for the Israelis, the dominant occupying military power.
Through multi-layered, highly malicious social programs, the Israelis continuously attempted to normalize their forced presence among the Palestinians and actively infiltrate their local social fabric. It was an incredibly difficult and harsh reality, leaving the abandoned Palestinians with absolutely no alternative but to contemplate reclaiming their stolen land themselves, despite it appearing to be an entirely impossible battle. Even though the regional balance of power had totally collapsed, with the sweeping Israeli military force receiving unlimited backing from global powers and complicit Arab regimes, the Palestinians never abandoned their core resistance. Following the bleak era of peace treaties and Arab normalization, the Palestinians would ultimately launch their most powerful and sustained wave of resistance yet.
How will this unfold? This dynamic shift will be explored in detail in the upcoming article In Shaa ALLAH.
We ask ALLAH, the Blessed and Exalted, to teach us what benefits us, to benefit us with what HE has taught us, and to increase us in knowledge. Peace, Mercy, and Blessings of ALLAH be upon you.
Sources:
Mohamed Elhamy. قصة فلسطين | 17. السقوط الضخم.. حرب أكتوبر وقصة الاستسلام والتطبيع. Telegram Video.
