Table of Contents
This ninth installment delves into the multifaceted forms of Palestinian resistance under British Mandate, exploring peaceful political strategies, armed uprisings, the Islamic essence of the struggle, and the enduring challenges amid colonial pressures.
Embracing the Roots of Palestinian Resistance
In the name of ALLAH, praise be to ALLAH, and peace and blessings upon the Messenger of ALLAH, His family, companions, and those who follow Him.
Welcome, dear brothers and cherished friends, to this ninth article in “The Story of Palestine“, where we briefly recount the essence of Palestinian history—from the emergence of the idea of Jewish return to Palestine up to the outbreak of the Flood in 2023. Through this, we seek to understand the roots of this story: why it remains fiercely ablaze after more than a century, how Theodor Herzl succeeded where his ancestors failed for three thousand years, and what the future holds as revealed in the Quran and Sunnah, and as indicated by events.
For those who value verification, I remind you that these articles are drawn from my book “Summary of the Story of Palestine“1. I’ll include a download link for anyone wishing to review and confirm the information from its sources.
In previous articles, we discussed Palestine’s occupation and Britain’s policy of nurturing and embracing a Jewish state, as well as Palestinian society under British rule. We reached the crucial question: How did this Palestinian society resist the encroaching Zionist threat? Now, we begin the story of Palestinian resistance.
If you’ve read the previous article and recall the conditions Palestinian society endured, we can then examine the forms of Palestinian resistance this society produced.
Let us divide Palestinian resistance into two categories to ease our understanding of what transpired:
- The first: Peaceful resistance, political resistance, legal resistance.
- The second: Armed or violent resistance, or that outside the law—the British law.
The focus starts with peaceful, political, or legal Palestinian resistance: This form sought to navigate paths reusing British politics, law, slogans, and principles to serve the Palestinian cause and people. It aimed to embarrass the British, compelling them to implement their declared principles and slogans, pressuring and denouncing them. These methods confront any tyrannical authority by highlighting its failure to enforce its own laws, appealing to institutions created by that authority itself.
This type of Palestinian resistance represents the recourse of the weak who have not yet gathered full strength—the weak lacking the capacity for confrontation. The discussion involves a society stripped of the Islamic power that once protected it, a society under continuous drain, subjected to a global superpower’s occupation, so naturally, Palestinian resistance begins in this manner.
Understanding the Nature of Peaceful Palestinian Resistance
Peaceful resistance, political resistance, and legal resistance represent approaches from which liberation cannot be expected, nor can independence be relied upon. However, when armed strength or other effective alternatives are lacking, and when the occupation holds dominance in an era of overwhelming Western superiority, the prolonged duration also leads certain segments to genuinely believe in peaceful solutions, especially when personal interests intertwine and align with them.
Under a militarily superior occupation, and when the occupation presents a cunning and deceptive political and legal facade, the occupier resorts—as previously noted—to employing the class of notables and the wealthy in its interest, granting them some gains and privileges, keeping them in place, or even creating positions and roles for them to undertake calming the people and controlling them.
Tamim al-Barghouti terms it the phenomenon of “tame nationalism“, with a book by that title discussing the Egyptian case, but this phenomenon exists in all Western colonies. This “tame nationalism” is a class of notables the occupation seeks to elevate above society as its leaders, fostering mutual interests. These notables move with the occupation to achieve whatever gains they can peacefully, competing among themselves on who is better at calming the people, controlling them, and sedating them, as well as competing before the people on who can achieve hoped-for demands and extract them from the occupation.
The extraction here is peaceful extraction without entering grand confrontations with severe losses and high costs. It must be emphasized that these cannot be described as treason outright; matters are complex and composite, combining weakness and incapacity, with public, national, personal, and family interests overlapping. Some may be naive and deceived, some trust and are loyal to the occupation, some transition—starting deceived and ending as steadfast resistors, some begin resisting then get absorbed and bought through enticement and intimidation, promise and threat, relapsing to align with the occupation and represent its interests.
Evaluation here for individuals and leaders must be individual, issued after broad investigation. But crucially, it must be understood that the fragmentation situation—dividing Arab states, in this case severing Palestine from its surroundings—deprived even Arab leaderships of their national extensions present at that time, or present in the Ottoman Empire era. Relations, spaces, capabilities, and authorities shrank to narrow national and patriotic ties, diminishing any leaderships’ capacities for confrontation, challenge, and Palestinian resistance.
This is the pattern that emerges first: the pattern of peaceful Palestinian resistance.
When discussing this peaceful Palestinian resistance, its most prominent scenes are a series of Arab conferences summarizing demands as: canceling the Balfour Declaration, halting Jewish immigration, stopping land sales to Jews, and demanding a legislative council representing Palestinians, from which a Palestinian government would emerge.
This series of conferences Palestinians held began with the first in 1919, in Jerusalem. This conference rejected dividing the Levant and even Palestine remaining independent—it affirmed Palestine as part of a unified Levant under broader Arab rule. But Western powers’ will was far stronger, and it was divided.
Aiding them was Sharif Hussein’s sons—Faisal and AbduLLAH—ruling Iraq and Jordan, previously Syria, their submission to foreigners complete, accepting whatever foreigners decided. Thus, Palestinian leaders had no one to rely on for keeping the Levant one state or Palestine part of broader Arab rule in Palestinian resistance.
Seven such conferences convened until 1928, chaired by Palestinian leader Musa Kazim al-Husseini. He remained Palestine’s political leader until his death in 1934.
To spite Musa Kazim al-Husseini, the British created the position of Mufti of Jerusalem—president of the Islamic Council managing Islamic affairs—appointing one of his cousins, aiming for division: Amin al-Husseini.
This caused tensions and splits. Amin al-Husseini was conciliatory toward the British in times of weakness, initially resisting then conciliating, later exerting strong, precious efforts resisting British occupation, becoming Palestine’s foremost, uncontested leader—the firm resistor against the British in Palestinian resistance.
The Islamic Character of Palestinian Resistance Efforts
One matter scarcely mentioned in historical studies by nationalists, pan-Arabists, and secularists is that this Palestinian resistance, in both peaceful and armed forms, was Islamic resistance, dominated by an Islamic character.
The era’s most prominent figure is Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, relying on the Husseini family’s strength and his religious standing as from a scholarly family and as mufti. His religious position, influence over waqfs, Sharia courts, presiding over judges, supervising imams and preachers, and the layer below: kuttab sheikhs—equivalent to elementary schools then, penetrating villages and society in Palestinian resistance.
He himself utilized these to revive religious gatherings and occasions as constant sparks for assembly and mobilization against colonial occupation. His religious stature granted broader extensions abroad, with political leaders or scholars and Islamic movement leaders. Thus, the party he led—Mufti’s front—garnered most people’s support nearly uncontested. Opposition, represented by the Nashashibi family, couldn’t balance Mufti’s strength, Amin al-Husseini.
We mentioned that peaceful resistance included conferences, celebrations, and mobilizations. It also involved other efforts, such as visits to London, some protests, issuing petitions, releasing appeals, collecting signatures, and similar activities linked to the realm of peaceful resistance. Naturally, these yield limited results in certain circumstances, but they do not significantly alter the course of the conflict.
This political, peaceful path faced two major blows. The first was the failure of Musa Kazim al-Husseini’s visit and the Arab delegation to London in 1930, followed by British Prime Minister MacDonald’s letter to Weizmann.
How did the failure appear? The failure of Musa Kazim al-Husseini’s visit was evident in a letter from British Prime Minister MacDonald to Chaim Weizmann. This letter affirmed Britain’s commitment to supporting Zionism, which is why it was called the Black Book. In it, Britain violated what it had promised Musa Kazim al-Husseini regarding controlling Jewish immigration just four months earlier, in October 1930.
Challenges and Responses in Non-Violent Efforts
By the way, this peaceful resistance was sometimes addressed through envoys, delegations, committees, and similar measures. In some of these committees, a British expert stated that no lands remained in Palestine that could be granted to Jewish immigrants. As a result, they issued the promise we mentioned in October 1930, only to breach it in February 1931.
Peaceful activities continued because even those who believed in armed resistance could not openly declare it. Moreover, believers in armed resistance needed peaceful activities. These peaceful efforts provided cover for the movement, allowed them to connect with people, stirred Arab and Muslim sentiments, enabled fundraising, facilitated launching initiatives, and helped attract and recruit suitable elements. Thus, these peaceful activities persisted.
For example, one of the most prominent was the General Islamic Conference held in Jerusalem in 1931. This conference was highly important, as it may have been the largest Islamic gathering in modern times in Jerusalem that year. It was attended by symbols of the Islamic world at the time, including its sheikhs and major figures, such as the great scholar Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Rida, the renowned Indian poet and thinker Muhammad Iqbal, the prominent Tunisian leader and thinker Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Thaalibi, and Shawkat Ali from India.
Key Decisions from Islamic Conferences
In this conference, they made several important decisions, such as establishing an Islamic university, founding a company to prevent lands from slipping into Jewish hands, and forming committees for Palestine in every country to follow its cause and provide support.
Another important conference in 1935 derived its significance from being a gathering of Palestinian scholars. In it, a fatwa was issued prohibiting the sale of land to Jews, and even declaring those who sell or participate in selling land to Jews as apostates.
We must also remember that the British presence, policy, and administration had the power to elevate or diminish figures. It could manipulate the influence of personalities, granting or revoking diplomatic representation as it wished. Through this authority, Britain could often corrupt any unity in ranks or attempts at Palestinian political representation by using those close to it or seeking proximity—whether deceived or complicit. This period witnessed extensive British manipulation in rivaling, suppressing, displacing, or excluding any emerging Palestinian leader.
This is a general picture of peaceful resistance.
Early Forms of Armed Palestinian Resistance
Now, turning to armed resistance: Despite all the tragedies Palestinians endured under British occupation rule, they did not cease resisting to the fullest extent possible under these harsh conditions. Thus, we can observe a discontinuous line of Palestinian uprisings.
These uprisings focused on the Jews, avoiding the British and concentrating on the Jews. Naturally, they did not want to open a front against the stronger and more violent side, which was Britain. It was as if the problem was an Arab-Jewish issue, with Britain as the arbiter, trying to force Britain to change its policy of empowering the Jews.
For example: the Jerusalem uprising in 1920, Jaffa in 1921, the Buraq uprising in 1929, the Jerusalem and Jaffa uprising in 1933, and other small uprisings. These are considered Islamic uprisings. If we examine them, we see that the toll of dead and wounded on both sides—Arabs and Jews—was close, but with the difference that Jews were killed by Arabs using white weapons like sticks and knives, while Arabs were killed by the British using firearms. This tells you to what extent the British stood with the Jews, and Arabs were carrying out what resembled martyrdom operations.
As is customary in any similar experience, individual initiatives and small factional efforts emerged. Sometimes, sailors in Jaffa bombed ships carrying Jewish immigrants. For example, small armed movements appeared but were quickly aborted and liquidated. One such was called “The Green Hand”, led by someone named Ahmed Tafish. It formed during the Buraq revolt but ended when its leader was captured in 1930.
In these movements, the pattern began to change—the pattern that targeted Jews while avoiding the British. Movements started appearing that targeted both enemies, and the idea prevailed that the British were the root of the ailment, or: the Jews were like the shadow of a tree; if the tree is cut, its shadow goes with it. This orientation appeared in the period of 1930-1935. If you recall, this period was extremely dangerous in the growth of the Jewish situation economically, in immigration, financially, and politically.
The Qassam Movement and Its Impact
These small seeds led to the largest uprising of that time, known as the revolt of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam. In 1935, Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam consulted Palestinian leaderships on the idea of igniting a revolt against the British. They replied: “No, the people are not ready, unprepared, the time is not suitable, there is still hope to reach some rights with the British—give dialogue and negotiation a chance”.
Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was not convinced and indeed ignited a revolt, becoming one of its martyrs. He was martyred on November 20, 1935, in the first battle he fought against the British.
After these years, the exact number of the organization Sheikh Izz ad-Din formed is not precisely known, but they were no less than two hundred and could not exceed eight hundred—these are the bounds researchers found. Also, we cannot know exactly when it began. Naturally, dating secret movements is difficult because most information is concealed, and most data comes from early mujahideen who were martyred. But in any case, its beginning would not predate 1925 nor postdate 1930.
We can also say that the regions where this movement was active were northern Palestine, as these areas are more fertile and have greater Jewish presence.
One of the most important conditions Sheikh Izz ad-Din required for those wishing to join the organization was readiness for armed jihad, evidenced by the affiliate buying his weapon with his own money—as proof of his seriousness and sacrifice.
This organization aimed to deter Jews and British, and also targeted spies and agents. It was called a cellular organization. Cellular means small groups linked to one only; an individual knows only his small group’s members, and this group knows only one, who knows a communication line to other cellular groups—the safest organizational forms for secret movements.
Legacy of Qassam and the Great Revolt
Consequently, when Sheikh Izz ad-Din was martyred, one of his companions took over—Sheikh Farhan al-Saadi, also among Palestine’s famous names.
What hastened Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s revolt decision was an incident in Haifa. Haifa is a famous port receiving ships, and Haifa people discovered one day that crates coming to Jewish merchants carried not goods or fabrics as assumed, but weapons and ammunition.
Once, a crate fell from a crane and broke, revealing it full of weapons, not fabrics—a famous Haifa incident. Thus, this renowned incident had multiple repercussions, even in Haifa people’s memoirs. It was one of moments when many thought of buying weapons and arming. This was among things hastening the revolt.
When discussing Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s organization, we find devout Islamists dominated it. As Sheikh Fathi al-Shaqaqi, may ALLAH mercy him, says: Among forty prominent names in the movement, thirty-six bore the “Sheikh” title: Sheikh so-and-so.
Ahmed al-Shuqayri, working in their defense, spoke in his memoirs of their patience and profound piety.
Sheikh Izz ad-Din found no support from any Arab regime; some writing his history say his death resulted from those Arabs’ collusion with British authorities.
When he died, even Palestinian notables and elites didn’t pray at his funeral—as, per the “tame nationalism” model—they were walking in a “terrorist’s” funeral or accused of terrorism. Thus, no one attended his funeral fearing British reaction.
Emergence of Other Armed Groups
In Jerusalem, another armed organization appeared, led by Abdul Qadir al-Husseini. This organization enjoyed patronage from Palestine’s political leader, Haj Amin al-Husseini. Historians say its members around 1935 numbered about four hundred.
Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s martyrdom resonated across the entire Arab world, igniting Palestine’s greatest revolt in history. This revolt is called “Palestinian Countryside Revolt“, “Great Palestinian Revolution“, and “Great Strike“.
This was the beginning—what happened? Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s martyrdom interacted with two others: First, British canceled forming a parliament in Palestine. They’d proposed it to calm atmospheres, then scrapped it, fueling anger. Second, Syrians staged a major strike; this general strike in Syria compelled France to announce a national government and begin handing rule in Syria—reviving hopes a similar strike in Palestine solves with British—when a strike succeeds somewhere, or a revolution in some lands, other lands aspire to do likewise.
Thus, these three: Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s martyrdom, British parliament project cancellation, Syria’s strike success—this stirred atmospheres awaiting a spark. The spark came in an operation executed by Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam’s followers under Farhan al-Saadi on April 15, 1936. Reactions escalated mutually until Palestinians declared a comprehensive strike starting April 1936, lasting six months—Palestine’s longest strike; some historians say the longest by an entire people. If Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, may ALLAH mercy him, died before seeing his effort’s fruit, Palestine witnessed it post-martyrdom, as his organization’s men were this great revolt’s prominent figures, alongside others from regional and tribal leaderships’ talented men.
But the political facade and leadership quickly formed in early days—from April 25, 1936—gathering existing Arab parties in Palestine, forming the “Arab Higher Committee”, led by Haj Amin al-Husseini. It presented political demands to end the strike: First, forming a Palestinian government accountable to an elected parliament—seeking political entity. Second, halting Jewish immigration. Third, halting land sales to Jews.
Now the revolt had paths; we start with political, later military and field.
The Political Dynamics of the Great Revolt
Political path: Britain stunned by this sudden development and general revolt ignition, pressed Palestinians with violence and politics to stop the strike—this astonishing in speed, spread, scope, and duration.
Britain used all cards, including pressuring Arab rulers submissive to its influence to intervene and pressure the Arab Higher Committee—now Palestinians’ political facade and leadership. Indeed, Arab rulers pressured the Arab Higher Committee.
Another political tactic: Britain said it’d send a high-level committee to investigate conditions, known as “Peel Committee”. Here, intimidation and inducement converged, with Britain’s violent military means—ongoing military violence—and inducement: high-level committee coming to investigate and solve—intimidation and pressure via pressing the Arab Higher Committee and using influence over Arab rulers.
Thus, Palestinians decided to end the strike after six months, perhaps allowing opportunity for these Arab and British political efforts. Again, I advise reading Amin al-Husseini’s memoirs then, as they’re important.
Did anything change? Nothing changed, they achieved nothing, ended the strike but gained nothing, Arab rulers did nothing. The British committee came, inquired, spent a year issuing its report—out in July 1937, concluding: partition Palestine between Arabs and Jews. This committee first proposed expelling and displacing the people from their land in 1937—a deeply shocking outcome.
Here, it revealed the matter wasn’t genuine but mere time-buying and revolt absorption attempt. Jews owned 5% land then; the committee recommended partition, granting them northern third Palestine—as shown on maps— from 5% to about 33%. Thus, Arabs got two-thirds, connecting Jerusalem-Haifa area a British colony, outside partition.
Naturally, this was another gain, strong for Jews, taken by British political force—not themselves.
This also fueled Palestinian people’s indignation, renewing their revolt. Then, Britain decided—or announced—dissolving the Arab Higher Committee and arresting its leaders. Indeed, arrested four, exiling them to Seychelles Island. As mentioned, Amin al-Husseini evaded—sought refuge in Al-Aqsa Mosque, escaping as detailed in his memoirs to Lebanon, then spreading abroad.
This is the political path, we can say ended with Amin al-Husseini’s flight—not entirely ended but its direct influence.
The Military and Field Efforts in the Revolt
Turning to military and field path: We find the revolt targeted collaborators and spies as much as Zionists and British. Attacked British government headquarters, governmental facilities, Jewish colonies, assassinated high officials, threatened Arab police elements—as we mentioned Arabs in British administration and institutions, so threatened Arab police.
Targeted transportation and communication lines, used by British forces: bridges, railways, telephone wires. In the past, no one had phones, so these modern tools seeming state tools served authority, thus targeting bridges, blasting bridges, blasting railways, cutting telephone wires, blasting British trains, blasting oil pipelines—all the revolt worked on.
The revolt’s operations peak was assassinating the British governor—named Lewis Andrews—on July 26, 1937, four days after Peel Committee’s results we mentioned, judging Palestine partition between Arabs and Jews.
The revolutionary situation expanded, we can say summer 1938 was this escalation’s zenith, as then revolutionaries could independentize all Palestinian countryside. No British government remained, even seizing some cities from British government for limited periods.
We remain in Palestinian resistance news, continuing it ALLAH willing in the next article.
We ask ALLAH, Blessed and Exalted, to teach us what benefits us, to benefit us with what HE taught us, and to increase our knowledge.
Peace be upon you and ALLAH’s mercy and blessings.
Sources:
- Mohamed Elhamy.قصة فلسطين | 9. النضال العظيم.. أهل فلسطين وحدهم في مواجهة القوى العظمى العالمية!!. YouTube Video.
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